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The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration
Arbitration of labor disputes is today "part and parcel" of the col-
lective bargaining process.' Approximately 94 per cent of all collective
agreements provide for arbitration of some or all contract disputes,2-
and such promises to arbitrate have been held to be specifically enforce-
able in federal courts.3 Congress has declared that "[linal adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is... the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement,"I and the
Supreme Court has held that arbitration serves the national interest by
offering an alternative to economic coercion.5
The growing popularity of arbitration as a means of resolving in-
dustrial disputes raises difficult questions as to the proper relationship
of the arbitral process to the National Labor Relations Board. The
jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the Board often overlap: most griev-
ances cognizable under the terms of an arbitration clause in a collec-
tive agreement can be framed to allege an unfair labor practice," and
since a majority of collective agreements incorporate one or more pro-
visions of the Taft-Hartley Act, many statutory violations are breaches
of contract as well.
Since Congress has declared that the Board's power to prevent unfair
labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law
or otherwise," 8 the Board has authority to consider unfair labor prac-
tice allegations whether or not an arbitrator could rule or has ruled on
the same charges. The concurrent jurisdiction of the arbitrator, how-
1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior 9- Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
2. U.S. BUREAU or LABOR STATirIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 1425.-1, MAjor
CoLLECra= BARGA G AGREmrENis 1 (1964)..
3. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d) [hereinafter cited as
Taft-Hardey Act or Act], 29 US.C § 173(d) (1964).
5. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 US. 574 (1960). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the implications of this view of arbitration, see Summers, Labor
Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function, 34 Ruv. Jun. U.P.R. 477 (1965).
6. NATIONAL ACADEnT or AnrrAToRs, Tm ARrrror, THE NLRB, Arm m Couvrs
121-22 (1967) (Statement of E. Lewis).
7. Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: jurisdictional Problems,
57 CoLuM. L. REv. 52, 68, 69 (1957).
8. Taft-Hartley Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
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ever, does raise a question whether the Board should exercise its au-
thority or defer to the arbitration process.
An examination of the NLRB decisions in which an arbitrator had
or could have ruled on an unfair labor practice allegation reveals that
the Board has wavered in both word and deed with respect to defer-
ence. The Board's first major statement on deference to arbitration
came in 1955, when it stated in Spielberg Mfg. Co.0 that, to promote
the statutory policy of encouraging the voluntary resolution of disputes,
it would not reconsider arbitrators' awards on their merits if: (1) the
proceedings were fair and regular; (2) all the parties had consented to
be bound by the arbitrator's decision; and (3) the award was not in-
consistent with the policies of the labor laws.
The sensible sounding if rough-hewn standards enunciated in Spiel-
berg were soon abandoned, however, as the Supreme Court began to
lavish unqualified praise upon the arbitral process. First, in Lincoln
Mills,0 the Court held agreements to arbitrate specifically enforceable
in the federal courts. Then, in the Steelworkers Trilogy". the Court
narrowed the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, proclaim-
ing the arbitrator's expertise as superior to that of the "ablest judge."' 2
The Court in these cases had no occasion to comment explicitly upon
the relationship between the arbitrator and the NLRB in disputes in-
volving collective agreements, but the Court's high regard for arbitra-
tion as a technique for settling a wide range of labor controversies was
not lost upon the Board. In International Harvester Co.13 the Board
drastically extended its carefully formulated Spielberg doctrine and
stated that it would refuse to adjudicate unfair labor practice claims
arising from the same facts as an arbitrated contract dispute unless the
arbitration proceedings were "tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness,
or serious procedural irregularities or ... the award was clearly repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act."'14 The Board elaborated
upon its "dearly repugnant" test by announcing that arbitrators' find-
ings on questions of law would stand unless they were "palpably
9. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For the purposes of this Note, willingness of the Courts of
Appeals to enforce Board rulings is irrelevant; consequently, citations to Courts of Appeals
cases reviewing N.L.R.B. decisions will not be given.
10. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 358 U.S. 448 (1957).
11. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 863 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 368 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960).
12. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
13. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
14. Id. at 927.
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wrong."'5 Further, in a series of later decisions the Board went beyond
deference to actual arbitration awards and refused to hear unfair labor
practice claims which were subject to an arbitration dause, whether the
parties had in fact resorted to arbitration or not.'"
The joint abdication of Board and Court to arbitration reached its
highwater mark in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.17 There the
Supreme Court compelled an employer to arbitrate an inter-union dis-
pute in the teeth of the Court's own concessions that the arbitrator was
powerless to bind all parties to the dispute and that the Board alone
could render a decision binding on the employer and on both rival
unions.
Although the Board rivalled the Supreme Court in praising arbitra-
tion,' 8 the rhetoric of International Harvester was never thoroughly
implemented in practice. Even in the heyday of the deference doctrine
between 1960 and 1964, the Board in fact deferred in only about 23
per cent of the cases in which the issue of arbitration was discussed.10
By the time the Supreme Court decided Carey, moreover, even the
Board's rhetorical infatuation had begun to subside in the face of its
own experience with cases involving arbitration. The Board has since
withdrawn from its most extreme phrasings of the "dearly repugnant"
and "palpably wrong" test.20 Similarly, the Board's General Counsel,
Arnold Ordman, has recently denied that the Board generally requires
exhaustion of contract remedies before deciding unfair labor practice
claims.2  Moreover, under the critical test of what the Board has done in
practice, the proportion of cases in which the Board has deferred to
arbitration has fallen from 23 per cent to 12 per cent of the cases in
which the deference issue was discussed during the period 1965-67.2
I. The Merits of Board Deference to Arbitration
The Board has never clearly set forth the factors which should deter-
mine its policy with regard to arbitration of those contract disputes
15. Id. at 929.
16. See, e.g., Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R3..
431 (1963).
17. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
18. See, e.g., Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Raley's Supermnarkets, 143
N.L.R.B. 256 (1963); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962); Hercules
Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
19. See Appendix A, Table I, infra.
20. See, e.g., W estinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.LR.B. No. 81, 64 LR.R.M I0M2
(Jan. 9, 1967).
21. Ordman, Arbitration and the NLRB-A Second Look, in Tilt Anonmwon, rim
NLRB, AuD = Coumas, supra note 6, at 55-56.
22. See Appendix A, Tables I and II, infra.
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which may also involve unfair labor practice claims. On the one hand,
Congress has expressed a policy in favor of private resolution of dis-
putes between employers and unions within the collective bargaining
framework, 23 and arbitration is the technique of private dispute resolu-
tion contracted for by the parties to the collective agreement. On the
other hand, three factors militate against allowing the arbitrator's
settlement of a dispute to be final in all cases. First, and perhaps most
important, a dispute may involve some policy of federal labor law other
than the policy of free collective bargaining between union and em-
ployer. While the arbitrator's function in settling a dispute normally
is only to discern the intent of the parties to the collective agreement,24
the Act explicitly protects interests which may not be reflected in the
union-employer bargaining process. For instance, Section 8(a)(3) forbids
discharge of an employee "to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization"; 2 this section expresses an affirmative policy
which cannot be overridden by any bargain between employer and
union. Similarly, Section 9 gives the Board authority to define "ap-
propriate" bargaining units; 26 thus clauses in collective agreements
purporting to provide for the settlement of the boundaries of a bar-
gaining unit should not be allowed to override the Board's judgment
of the appropriate boundaries. Arbitrators, whatever their expertise
in discerning the "common law of the shop," do not pretend to be ex-
perts at statutory interpretation; 27 indeed, many of them are not even
lawyers. 28
23. § 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964), provides In pertinent
part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
24. An arbitrator ... is the creature and servant of the parties selected to determine
disputes arising under the system of private law found in the collective bargaining
contract and in the practices and customs which illuminate the nature and extent
of the promises and arrangements evidenced by that contract. He has a limited
charter "in a system of self government created by and confined to the parties."
The arbitrator, therefore, determines private rights and private duties stemming
from a private contract [footnotes omitted].
Ordman, The Arbitrator and the NLRB-A Second Look, in TrnE A rraTR, Tur
NLRB, AND THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 48-49. See also Fuller, Collective Bargaining
and the Arbitrator, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRArORS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
THE AmITRATOR'S ROLE 8 (M. Kahn ed. 1962), P. HAYs, LABoR ARBITRATION, ch. 2 (1965);
Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAnv. L. REV. 999 (195).
25. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
26. Sections 9(a) and 9(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), (b) (1904).
27. For an extensive discussion of the authority and qualifications of arbitrators to
interpret statutory policy, see TnE ARBTrATOR, Tim NLRB, AND THE COURTS, supra note
6, at 47-228.
28. In a 1962 survey of its members, the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA),
a highly selective association of professional arbitrators, found that only 87 of the 175
respondents had a basic law degree (LL.B. or J.D). Survey of Arbitration in I962,
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Second, arbitration proceedings bind only the parties to the contract
who have consented to arbitration.20 Yet many labor disputes, notably
controversies over the jurisdiction of unions and the assignment of
work, involve an employer and two unions; such disputes may involve
two conflicting collective agreements. Since disputes of this kind cannot
be concluded by bilateral arbitration, Board deference to the arbi-
trator's decision has little point.30
Third, the structure of arbitration creates the danger of procedural
unfairness in certain cases. Arbitrators are chosen and paid by the
parties to the collective agreement, the union and the employer. When
disputes reflect a clash of interests between these parties, economic
self-interest forces the arbitrator to take full account of the claims of
both. But in some cases an employee or group of employees may have
interests which run counter to those of both union and management.
Here the arbitrator has a natural tendency to look to the interests of
the parties upon whose continued support depends his tenure or his
chances of being hired again. Where, for example, a dissident member
of a local union wishes to press a grievance against the employer, it re-
quires no extraordinary cynicism to doubt that an arbitrator hired by
the local and the employer will be sympathetic to his claims.30
These three factors favoring nondeference correspond roughly to
those originally proposed by the Board in Spielberg, and the principle
of that case-that where any of the three is present, the Board will not
defer-provides the foundation for a coherent doctrine to govern the
overlapping jurisdiction of the Board and the arbitrator. To develop
a set of rules which will give predictability to the Board's treatment of
arbitration awards, the likely presence or absence of these factors must
be analyzed in each of the important classes of unfair labor practice
cases to which an arbitration award might be relevant.
For purposes of this analysis, labor disputes coming before the
NLRB can be classified into three broad categories. First are disputes
over the boundaries of the bargaining unit, the proper representative
for the employees in the bargaining unit, or the jurisdiction of com-
peting unions over particular jobs. Second are disputes in which em-
in NATIONAL ACADEmy oF ARBnTRATORS, LABOR ARBFrrATXON-PZ$sPECfvES AZ D PnOBL
S04 (,N. Kain ed. 1964). It is reasonable to speculate that the great number of arbitrators
who fail to meet the relatively high standards of the NAA do not exceed the NAA's
percentage of members with legal training.
29. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
80. See pp. 1198-1203 infra.
31. cf. p. HA's, LABOR ARBITRATioN, L 2 (1966).
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ployers are charged with the pro- or anti-union discriminatory prac-
tices forbidden by Sections 8 (a)(1) to (4),32 or unions are charged with
violations of the discrimination provisions of Section 8(b).83 Third are
disputes in which an employer is charged with a refusal to bargain in
good faith under an existing collective agreement in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5).8 4 The compartments are not watertight-for example,
bargaining unit disputes often arise in the form of an 8(a)(5) allegation
-but in practice they form useful and generally distinct categories.
II. Bargaining Unit, Representation, and Work Disputes
A. Bargaining Unit and Representation Disputes
The Board's statutory duty to define the appropriate bargaining
unit and supervise the election of the proper bargaining representative
for the employees leaves little or no scope for deference to arbitration.
Congress has directed the Board to define the unit in such a way as to
"assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this Act;"8 5 it has filled out the general principle with certain
specific prohibitions and restrictions upon bargaining units.8 0 The
thrust of the statutory language is that bargaining units are to be con-
structed so as to protect the rights of individual workers who might be
ignored or overridden by an opposed majority in an inappropriate unit,
and so as to create a balanced economic structure within which the
clash of free collective bargaining can take place. 7 Since the "appro-
priate" bargaining unit, and the proper election of its representative,
32. Taft-Hartley Act, §§ 8(a)(1)-(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(4) (1964).
33. Taft-Hartley Act §§ 8(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1), (2) (1964).
34. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
35. Taft-Hartley Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
36. § 9(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964). Section 9(c)(5) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1964) provides that: "[i]n determining whether a
unit is appropriate . . . the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be
controlling."
37. The determination of the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is necessarily a
highly subjective task. The Board has said, "There is nothing in the statute which re-
quires that the unit for bargaining be the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit,
or the most appropriate unit; the Act requires only that the unit be 'appropriate.'"
Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950) (footnote omitted). Moreover,
numerous factors, including the history of collective bargaining in the plant and industry,
the integration of processes and management, the skills of the workers, the desires of em-
ployees, the protection of minorities, the preservation of craft distinctions, the extent of
union organization, the impact on the balance of power between employer and union,
must be considered and weighed in deciding whether the unit certified should be the
department, craft, plant, enterprise, or multi-employer association. See A. Cox & D, Bo,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 328-48 (6th ed. 1965). Compare NLRB v. Tones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947), with NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380
U.S. 438 (1965).
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are the pre-conditions for collective bargaining, the Board should not
in these cases defer to the results of prior bargaining-the collective
agreement as interpreted by an arbitrator.
In a few cases,38 the Board has in effect let an arbitrator decide bar-
gaining unit and representation issues, with unfortunate results. In
Raley's Supermarkets, Inc.,39 the Building Service Employees Inter-
national Union, the petitioner, sought a unit of 14 janitors and 3
bottle sorters employed at the employer's 12 retail food stores. The
other store employees were represented by the Retail Clerks Union,
the intervenor, under a multi-employer collective agreement. In July
1962 the employer and the petitioning union entered into a contract
covering the janitors. About the same time, the intervening union re-
quested that the employer include the janitors and bottle sorters under
its multi-employer contract. The employer refused, citing his contract
with the petitioning union. Pursuant to a ruling of the Board's Re-
gional Office, the contract between the employer and the petitioning
union was cancelled; an arbitrator then decided that the janitors were
included under the intervening union's collective agreement. The
Board then rejected the petitioning union's claim to represent the
janitors, relying solely on the arbitrator's decision, which was found
to be free of procedural defects, germane to the representation issue,
and not repugnant to the policy of the Act.
The Board ignored the central question in the case-a question
which the arbitrator could not have considered in his job of contract
interpretation. The janitors, a group of employees which concededly
had not in the past been considered within the larger bargaining unit
represented by the Retail Clerks, were thrust into that unit without
consideration of whether their interests might be better served by a
separate unit, and without any opportunity for them to choose their
own bargaining representatives in accordance with the statutory secret
ballot procedure.
Recently the Board has retreated from its position in Raley's. Two
June 1966 cases presented classic bargaining unit disputes: an em-
ployer has a collective agreement with Union A; Union B seeks to
represent certain employees arguably covered by that agreement; em-
ployer and Union A hire an arbitrator who holds that Union A's col-
S8. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 147 N.LR. 1233 (1964); Insulation &
Specialties, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1540 (1963); Raley's Supermarkets, Inc., 143 NJ..R.B. 256
(1963.)
39. 143 NL.R.B. 256 (1963).
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lective agreement covers the disputed employees. In Hotel Employers
Association40 and Pullman Industries Inc.41 the Board refused to defer
to the arbitration award, holding that bargaining unit definition was
not to be decided by contract interpretation.
The hardening of the Board's attitude against arbitration emerges
perhaps most dearly in Westinghouse Electric Corp.,42 the sequel to
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.43 In Carey the Electrical Workers
(IUE) claimed that certain employees represented by a local white
collar union belonged within the IUE's ambit, and sued to compel arbi-
tration under its collective agreement with Westinghouse. The Su-
preme Court held that Westinghouse had to arbitrate, despite the fact
that the white collar union would not be party to the arbitration, and
despite the possible noncontractual bargaining unit issues presented
by the dispute. The arbitrator, in a classically Solomonic decision,
split the disputed unit in half. The Board refused to defer, holding
that:
Here, as in the Hotel Employers Association case, the ultimate
issue of representation could not be decided by the Arbitrator on
the basis of his interpreting the contract under which he was au-
theorized to act, but could only be resolved by utilization of Board
criteria for making unit determinations.44
In Carey the Supreme Court had compelled arbitration with these
soothing words from Mr. Justice Douglas: "The superior authority of
the Board may be invoked at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of arbi-
tration is brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area."46 But
the arbitrator could not serve as a labor therapist where the issue-
the proper definition of the bargaining unit-was logically prior to
the collective agreement from which his authority sprang. When the
case, long delayed by the Court's insistence on arbitration, finally
reached the right forum, the Board properly decided the issue de novo
with no reliance on the arbitrator's reading of the irrelevant collective
agreement.
B. Jurisdictional Disputes
Labor law has traditionally distinguished between bargaining unit
representation disputes on the one hand, and so-called jurisdictional
40. 159 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966).
41. 159 N.L.R.B. 580 (1966).
42. 162 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 64 L.R.R.M. 1082 (Jan. 9, 1967).
43. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
44. 64 L.R.R.M. at 1083 (1967).
45. 375 US. at 272.
1198
Vol. 77: 1191, 1968
The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration
disputes on the other.46 The former kind of dispute typically arises when
an employer adds a substantial number of new employees, as when a
new plant or a new department is added. The question then arises
whether the new employees fit into an existing bargaining unit, or
whether they make up a new one, and if the latter, who is to represent
them. The jurisdictional dispute is typically on a smaller scale, and
always involves a contest between two unions over which one will have
a particular job assigned to its members. The conceptual division be-
tween the two types of disputes is often unclear; a controversy between
two unions can frequently be cast either in terms of who gets the
men or who gets the work.47 In such a case the dispute involves
drawing or redrawing the boundaries of a bargaining unit, and the
rights of workers to be "appropriately" represented may be at stake.
When jurisdictional disputes genuinely involve controversies over the
"appropriateness" of one bargaining unit rather than another for a
particular job, the Board should decide such questions without defer-
ence to any arbitration award, for the same reasons given by the Board
in the more typical representational disputes discussed above.48
But the traditional distinction between representational and juris-
dictional disputes does make sense in many cases. Some disputes so
dearly involve only the interests of unions in claiming particular work
for their existing members that they can hardly be seen as raising sig-
nificant questions of the rights of individual workers to be "appro-
priately" represented. They are rather disputes over the extent to
which the rival unions have bargained for the work in question. As
such, they seem at first glance to be the precise sort of dispute best
settled by arbitration.
Another defect of arbitration, however, militates against deference
even in "pure" jurisdictional disputes-the bipartite nature of arbi-
tration. The source of the arbitrator's power is the contract between
the disputants.49 Just as he lacks jurisdiction over a noncontractual
disagreement, he also lacks power over strangers to the contract.
46. The conventional distinction between the two is that bargaining unit and repre-
sentation disputes involve the questions of which, if any, union shall represent a group
of employees, and what the characteristics of that group will be, while jursdictional dis-
putes involve the question of which, if any, union shall have the right to have work
performed by the union's members.
47. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 US. 261 (1964). wherein the
Supreme Court confessed that it was uncertain whether the controversy before it was over
representation or jobs.
48. See p. 1196 supra.
49. M. TRorTA, LABOR ARBrrRXTION 81-87 (1961).
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If Union A and Union B both claim the right to perform certain
work, there is a jurisdictional dispute. If Union A has a contract with
Company C, it may demand that C arbitrate its work claim under the
arbitration provisions of A's contract. If Union B also has a contract
with C, it may demand that C arbitrate its grievance under B's con-
tract. The result may be that the arbitrator under A's contract will
award the work to A, while the arbitrator under B's contract will
award the same work to B. The employer may thus be subject to two
conflicting arbitration awards, both of which will be binding as to him,
but neither of which will bind both unions. Union B, which was not
a party to A's contract with C, is not bound by the arbitrator's award
under that contract; similarly, Union A, which was not a party to B's
contract with C, is not bound by the arbitrator's award under that con-
tract. Precisely this series of events occurred in the News Syndicate Co.
case.50 Not surprisingly, the Board refused to defer to either arbitration
award.
Bipartite arbitration is thus futile: no single arbitrator has power
over all the parties to the dispute. Tripartite arbitration would con-
clusively resolve jurisdictional controversies, but it can only be achieved
through two means: the voluntary agreement of all disputants to be
bound by the decision of a mutually acceptable arbitrator; or the
compulsory submission of the dispute to an arbitrator against the
wishes of one or more of the contestants.
The construction industry has been the only industry where a sig-
nificant effort has been made to resolve jurisdictional issues through
tripartite arbitration. The Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional
Disputes established by the AFL-CIO is composed of an impartial
chairman and an equal number of labor and employer members. It
has jurisdiction over all unions affiliated with the Building and Con-
struction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and all contractors em-
ploying members of unions affiliated with the Department who have
signed a stipulation binding them to abide by the Joint Board's de-
cisions. 51 The greatest problem of the Joint Board has been persuading
employers to agree to submit jurisdictional disputes to it.52 Although
50. 141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963).
51. K. STRAND, JURISDIcTiONAL DisPuTEs IN CONSTRUcION 94 (1961).
52. There appear to be two main reasons why employers have been reluctant to sub.
mit jurisdictional disputes to the Joint Board. First, contractors seem to have a justilable
fear that the union-originated, union-dominated Joint Board is union.oriented. At the
inception of the Joint Board there was considerable opposition within the AFL.CIO to
allowing employers to participate in the tribunal's deliberations. K. STRAND, JuisDicrIONAL
DispuTrEs IN CONSTRUCTION 93 (1961). Moreover, the factors which the Joint Board stresses
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the NLRB has, on the whole, seemed quite willing to defer to the
Joint Board's processes in jurisdictional disputes, in the great majority
of cases it has found that the Joint Board lacked jurisdiction over one
or more of the contestants.53
Arguably, the NLRB might enforce Joint Board decisions even
though the employer was not a party to the proceeding. Neither the
language of Section 10(k) nor the legislative history compels the con-
clusion that the employer is an essential party to the resolution of the
jurisdictional dispute.5 4 Congress, in enacting Sections 8(b) (4)(D) and
10(k), apparently conceived of employers as parties neutral between
two competing unions, caught in the cross fire of a dispute in which
they have no stake.;5
The truly neutral employer's interests are fully protected by any
binding award of the disputed work to one or the other of the unions.
The Joint Board's award accomplishes precisely this result; thus, the
statutory policy of insulating the neutral employer from inter-union
in awarding work are not the managerial concepts of productivity, efidency and cost, but
rather precedent. Id. 95-96.
Second, employers have enjoyed a remarkably successful record of having the NLRB
award the work to whichever union the employer prefers. In only one of the 21 cases
in which the Board decided on the merits disputes which the employer refused to submit
to the Joint Board's jurisdiction did the NLRB fail to uphold the employer's decision as
to which union should get the work. The contrast between the orientation of the NLRB
and the Joint Board is most strikingly revealed by the fact that in 15 of the 17 cases
where the Joint Board rendered a decision despite the employer's refusal to submit to its
jurisdiction, the NLRB found that the Joint Board had awarded the work to the wrong
union (i.e., a union other than the one preferred by the employer).
For citations to the cases in which the NLRB decided on the merits disputes which
the employer refused to submit to the Joint Board see Appendix B, infra.
53. Out of a total of 29 cases in which the question of deference to the Joint IMoard
was presented, the NLRB found that the Joint Board had jurisdiction over all the parties
in only eight of them. In only five of the cases is it dear that the Joint Board lacked
jurisdiction over both unions, as well as over the employer. For citations to these cases,
see Appendix B, infra.
54. Section 10(k) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158[8](b) of this title, the Board
is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such
charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory
evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjust-
ment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the deci-
sion of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge
shall be dismissed.
The term " parties," as used in that section, seems to have been intended to refer solely
to the rival unions. See, e.g., 1 NATIONAL LABOR REATIONs BoAn, LEGisLATivE HiSTORy
oF THE LABOR MfANAGEMENT iREATIONS Acr, 1947, at 480-81 (SEN-ATE Mubonn REP.
No. 105, PT. 2, on S.1126) (1948) [hereinafter cited as LcrisrtAmu Hisrorv]; id. 561
(HousE CoNF. REP. 510, on H.R. 3020); 2 LEGI.SL&'nxE HsroRy 1046 (remarks of Sen-
ator Murray); id. 1554-55 (remarks of Senator Morse).
55. See, e.g., I LEGsLATrVE HsroRY 314-15 (H.R. REP. No. 245, on H.R. 8020); cf. id.
480-81 (SENATE MIoTrrY REP. No. 105, Pr. 2, on S. 1126); id. 583 (remarks of Represen-
tative Landis); id. 615 (remarks of Representative Hartley).
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disputes may be fulfilled if the NLRB prohibits the losing union from
interfering with the employer's grant of the work to the union desig-
nated by the Joint Board.
If the employer prefers one union to the other, it is presumably
either because he feels he can bargain with the preferred union for
more advantageous wages, hours, and working conditions, or because
he feels that the members of the preferred union are better qualified
to do the work. Yet if the unions have agreed between themselves which
should get the work, or have submitted their dispute to arbitration
binding upon themselves, the employer's conflict with the wage and
hour demands of the winning union is arguably no longer of the juris-
dictional type. It is rather a straight economic conflict between a union
and an employer, to be settled by bargaining and ultimately by eco.
nomic force. If the employer counters the demands of the winning
union by employing other workers (whether members of the losing
union or others), subsequent picketing by the winning union would
not then be a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D).
No case involving compulsory tripartite arbitration has yet come
before the NLRB; but since its use in one celebrated instance-the
National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. 6 dispute-the technique of involun-
tary tripartite arbitration has been much discussed.57 In National Steel,
the Iron Workers and the Machinists were both doing silver soldering
at the Company's shipyard. The Iron Workers invoked arbitration
under their contract with the employer to obtain an award that the
work was either exclusively theirs or exclusively the Machinists. The
Company argued that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to render such
an award because only one union was party to the arbitration proceed
ing. The arbitrator held that he had the legal power to issue an order
of joinder, after due notice, making a union which was not a party to
the collective agreement a party to the arbitration proceeding under
that contract. The Ironworkers moved for the issuance of the suggested
order for a trilateral arbitration hearing. The Machinists replied that
they would not enter a tripartite arbitration unless compelled to do so
by the courts. After the arbitrator ordered joinder, the Ironworkers
petitioned the Superior Court of California to enforce the order
against the Machinists; the dispute was then settled out of court through
the internal AFL-CIO jurisdictional dispute procedures.
56. 40 Lab. Arb. 625, 631, 838, 841 (1963) (Jones, Arbitrator).
57. See, e.g., articles cited notes 58 and 59 infra.
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Professor Bernstein 58 has raised persuasive arguments against the
torrent of claims published by the National Steel arbitratorrO that com-
pulsory tripartite arbitration is the ideal forum for jurisdictional dis-
putes. As Bernstein points out, the basis of legal enforcement of arbi-
tration awards is the agreement of the parties to resolve their disputes
in a forum of their own choice." Under the National Steel technique,
however, the non-party union is forced to make its case in a forum it
has not chosen, before a "judge" selected by the other two parties. Thus
tripartite arbitration is achieved, but only at the cost of its volun-
tariness, the very factor which makes it a preferred remedy under the
Taft-Hartley Act.8 '
The NLRB provides a better forum for the settlement of jurisdic-
tional disputes. It has jurisdiction over all the parties, it is neutral, and
it can enforce its decision through court order. 2 To the extent that
jurisdictional disputes overlap representation issues, the Board can
insure that statutory standards for defining bargaining units are not
sacrifice& 63 Furthermore, its processes are comparatively rapid in this
area: the Board gives special priority to jurisdictional disputes." Ex-
cept in the case where the National Joint Board or a similar body has
58. Bernstein, Nudging and Shoving All Parties to a Jurisdictional Dispute into Arbi-
tration: The Dubious Procedure of National Steel, 78 HAsv. L. REv. 784 (19635).
59. Jones, Autobiography of a Decision: The Function of Innovation in Labor Arbi-
tration, and the National Steel Orders of Joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
987 (1963); Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey Decision and
Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.LA.L. REv. 327 (1964); Jones,
Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some
Hypotheses, 11 U.CLA.L REv. 675 (1964); Jones, Compulsion and the Consensual in
Labor Arbitration, 51 VA. L. REv. 369 (1965); Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the Na-
tional Steel Arbitration into a Dubious Procedure, 79 HAiv. L. REv. 327 (1965); Jones,
Jurisdictional Dispute Arbitration: The Jostling Professors, 14 U.C.L.A.L REv. 347, 351
(1966) (debate with Bernstein).
60. Bernstein, Jurisdictional Dispute Arbitration: The Jostling Professors, 14 U.C.LA.
L. RE V. 347, 351 (1965) (debate with Jones).
61. Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964) provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desir-
able method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement [emphasis added]....
62. The Board's jurisdiction rests on § 10(k) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k)
(1964), which provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice vthin
the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title [which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a jurisdictional dispute], the Board is
empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute. ...
Section 10() of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1964), authorizes the Board to petition any
district court of the United States for appropriate injunctive relief pending final adjudi-
cation by the Board of the dispute. Section 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § IGO(e) (1964)
grants the Board the power to petition any court of appeals or district court of the United
States for the enforcement of the Board's orders.
63. See p. 1196 supra.
64. 29 C.F.R. § 102.89 (1967).
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jurisdiction over all the parties to a dispute-which will only be the
case when all the parties have at least arguably consented to arbitration
-the NLRB should settle jurisdictional disputes without deference
to arbitration.
III. Employer and Union Discriminatory Practice Cases
Although employer and union discriminatory practice cases are
usually quite distinct,65 there can be overlap of the two, 6 and sin'ce
the considerations governing deference are quite similar in both types
of cases, it is convenient to consider them together. In both groups
of cases two of the factors militating against deference to arbitration
are present: the risk that statutory policies will be ignored or mis-
construed by the arbitrator, and the danger that the proceeding will
be marred by bias if not outright corruption.
The first of these points is well illustrated by Monsanto Chemical
Co.61 There the arbitrator stated, in upholding the discharge of a
union steward for failing to explain satisfactorily his absence from
work:
I have given a good deal of thought to the dilemma which arises
out of the dual jurisdiction over the essence of the unfair labor
practice charges. Because the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction in
the event of a conflict, and because I believe the case can be
decided on other grounds, I have chosen to ignore for purposes
of decision the allegations herein contained that [the employee's]
activities played a part in his discharge. 3
While the arbitrator in Monsanto was unusually frank in disavowing
consideration of statutory policies, his position is by no means unique.
Much of the agenda at a recent meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators was devoted to the question of the extent, if any, to which
arbitrators should consider the policies of the labor laws when con-
struing collective agreements. 609 Moreover, even when arbitrators do
65. The most typical example of an employer discriminatory practice is the discharge
of an employee because of his pro-union activity. E.g., National Screen Products Co,, 147
N.L.R.B. 746 (1964). In marked contrast, the usual union discriminatory practice case Is
characterized by an attempt by the union to punish an employee for failure to support
the union. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
66. A typical example of an overlap is the case where an employer accedes to a union's
demand that an employee be discharged for violation of his duties as a union member.
E.g., International Harvester Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
67. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
68. Id. at 1099.
69. THE ARBrhATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE Couars, supra note 6, chs. III-IV.
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look to the statutes, many lack all qualifications to discern statutory
objectives and apply statutory standardsY Finally, the ground upon
which the Supreme Court has favored deference to arbitrators is their
knowledge of industrial practices and the "common law of the shop,"
7'
not their skill at statutory construction or their fitness to promulgate
national labor policy.
The Board's early failure to distinguish between the competence of
the arbitrator to construe collective agreements and his lack of
authority and ability to interpret statutory policy is epitomized by the
International Harvester Co.72 case. There the employer and the UAW
were parties to a union-shop contract that expired on August 1, 1958.
In April of that year an employee revoked the company's authority to
check off his union dues. On July 1 the union certified to the company
that the employee was more than 60 days in arrears and requested that
he be discharged for failure to pay his dues. The company refused,
contending that under the Indiana right-to-work law the union-security
clause was unenforceable. The union invoked the arbitration process
and the arbitrator sustained the union's position in part, holding that
the employee should have been discharged during the remaining time
of the contract, but rehired upon the contract's expiration.
The Board, with two members dissenting, deferred to the arbitrator's
award. The majority argued that it was unnecessary to consider the
legality of the union-shop contract under Indiana law and the right
of the union to pursue its demand for the employee's discharge after
the contract expired:
We need not decide these questions ... since it plainly appears
to us that the award is not palpably wrong. To require more of
the Board would mean substituting the Board's judgment for that
of the arbitrator, thereby defeating the purpose of the Act. . . ."
The judgment of the arbitrator to which the Board deferred did not
merely involve his determining the intent of the parties in forming
their collective agreement; it necessarily also involved an interpretation
of the Indiana right-to-work law and its relation to Section 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act 74-- an important question of federal labor policy. To
70. Cf. P. HAys, LABOR ARBITRATION, ch. 2 (1965).
71. United Steelvorkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
72. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
73. Id. at 928, 929.
74. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Harfley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964) provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
1205
The Yale Law Journal
allow a private arbitrator to determine this policy subject to review
only if "palpably wrong" was a remarkable misdelegation of authority,
Deference to arbitration in discriminatory practice cases creates
risks that petitioning employees will be denied due process, as well as
that federal statutory policies will be slighted. On the simplest level,
the renowned "flexibility" of the arbitral process often means no more
than procedural laxity. Fleming reports that most arbitrators take
past misconduct into account in determining whether an employee
is guilty of the conduct for which he was discharged, do not require
that the employee have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
his accusers, take into account that an employee refuses to testify, and
permit evidence obtained through improper searches and seizures to be
admitted75 Such informality may be appropriate in cases where union
and employer-parties of relatively equal resources-are squarely
opposed on the merits of the dispute. But in many discriminatory
practice cases the complaining employee's interests are not equivalent
to those of the union or of the employer 16-yet they are formally the
parties to the arbitration, they have hired the arbitrator, and they alone
have the resources to protect themselves against procedural laxity.
Motives other than protecting the individual employee may guide
a union in the vigor with which it presses grievances." Strict screening
ment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application Is prohibited
by State or Territorial Law.
75. R. FLEMING, TiE LABOR ARBITRAlION Proc.ss ch. 7 (1965).
76. See, e.g., Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 65 L.R.RM. 1127
(May 12, 1967); Auburn Rubber Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 301 (1965); Frazier-Davis Constr. Co.,
145 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1964); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B, 51.3 (1963); International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962); Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962),
Walsh Constr. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 260 (1961); John I. Paulding, Inc., 130 N.L.RB. 1035
(1961); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1960).
77. To the uninitiated, grievance arbitration looks like a simple and logical terminal
point for deciding contractual disputes on which the parties cannot agree. There are,
in fact, many reasons for going to arbitration which have little or nothing to do wIth
the merits of the dispute. The grievance procedure is not, and cannot be, isolated
from the bargaining relationship between the parties to the contract, A good example
is the familiar phenomenon of multiple grievances being slated for arbitration during
the period of contract negotiations, but being withdrawn as soon as a contract is
agreed upon. Bargaining pressure is simply being exerted through the grievance chan.
nel. There are many other institutional problems which must be taken into account.
No impartial machinery which is always limited to the same two parties can survive
if one side always wins. In bringing cases the parties take this into consideration.
Being a political organization is an additional problem for the union. Too rigid screen-
ing of grievances can alienate needed local support. It may be better to blame an
adverse decision on an arbitrator than to assert that the grievance is wholly without
merit. Newly elected officers may take cases to arbitration to fulfill campalqn promises,
or just to gain experience for the future. In an otherwise peaceful and quiet plant an
occasional arbitration may inject some color and excitement to whet the interest of
committeemen. On the management side, the company may prefer to back rather
than reverse an erring foreman. Or a clash in views may exist between the operating
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of grievances may be a bargaining counter with which the union wins
collective advantages-while the worker whose grievance has been
screened out suffers an individual loss. In more extreme cases-
especially where the worker with the grievance is at odds with the local
union leadership-actual collusion between union and employer may
lead to "rigged" arbitration avards.78
The institutional bias of arbitration towards the union and the em-
ployer is compounded by the tradition that the union has full control
over the petitioning employee's side of the case.7 Procedurally, this
again leads to remarkable "flexibility"; that is, the employee often can-
not participate in the hearing, employ his own counsel, or conduct his
own case.80
The arguments against deference where employer discriminatory
practices are charged apply a fortiori to allegations of union discrimina-
tory practices. Where arbitration is available in the latter kind of case
the proceeding takes place before a "judge" selected by a hostile union
and an often wholly disinterested employer. The employee is left to his
own resources to present his case against a well-endowed union which
is paying half of the arbitrator's fee.
The Star Expansion Industries Corp.S' case vividly illustrates how
little protection arbitration affords the discharged worker, particularly
when he is at odds with his union. There the employee, a union
steward, was a militant supporter of the UE. He had led a successful
campaign for the decertification of the IBEW and the certification of
the rival UE; he was discharged for allegedly "talking strike," urging
and industrial relations divisions, with the latter preferring to have the arbitrator
push the company in the direction they deem desirable or inevitable.
R. FLE,,Irn, TnE LABOR ARrrRAN PRocs 20-21 (1965).
78. For conflicting views as to the frequency with which rigged awards are rendered,
compare P. HAYs, LABoR ARBrrRATIoN 62-66 (1966), with Meltzer, Book Review, 84 U. C.
L Rav. 211 (1966); Seitz, Two Faces of Arbitration: Which Book Do You Read? 19 STA'u.
L. RF-v. 698 (1967); Stackman, Now, Who Shall Arbitrate? 19 SrAN. L. Rxv. 707 (1967);
and Vladeck, Book Review, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1021 (1966).
79. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Summers, Individual Rights in Col-
lective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 862 (1962); Comment, Individual
Control over Personal Grievances under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 Y= L.J. 559 (1963). But cf.
Taft-Hartley Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), which states, in pertinent part:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances ad-
justed, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the ad-
justment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
80. See, e.g., Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.RB. No. 95, 65 LR.R.M. 1127
(May 12, 1967); F. J. Buckner Corp., 163 N.L.R.1. No. 7, 64 L.RLRM. 1273 (Feb. 27,
1967); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
81. 164 N.LR.B. No. 95, 65 L.R.RM. 1127 (fay 12, 1967).
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a slow down, and engaging in racial discrimination. Because he was
discharged while the IBEW was still the recognized union, the em-
ployee was forced to seek relief under the IBEW contract. The arbitral
proceeding took place before an arbitrator selected by the IBEW, and
the employee was represented by an IBEW attorney who had published
a letter maligning him for his activities in behalf of the UE. Not
surprisingly, the arbitrator held that the discharge was for just cause.
In view of the grave dangers arbitration in employer or union dis-
criminatory practice cases presents to statutory policies and to the due
process rights of employees, the Board might properly adopt a flat rule
against deference in such cases. Indeed, such a rule seems to exist in
practice; after a few unfortunate examples of deference to possibly
rigged or procedurally unfair awards in the early sixtiesA 2 the Board
has deferred in only two discrimination cases since 1964.83
IV. Refusal to Bargain Cases
Claims alleging refusals to bargain during the contract term are of
two main types. One type consists of cases in which the employer re-
fuses to give the union information which it requests; the other type
consists of cases in which the employer has taken some unilateral
action without first negotiating to an impasse with the union and
complying with the notice requirements of Section 8(d) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
A. Discovery
In a staple refusal to bargain case of the first sort, a union will re-
quest an employer to supply information which the union needs, either
82. See, e.g., Modern Motor Express, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964); Frazier-DavS
Constr. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1964); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416
(1961); Walsh Constr. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 260 (1961); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B.
1052 (1960).
83. The two exceptions are Schott's Bakery, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 65 L.R.R.M.
1180 (May 4, 1967), and Howard Elec. Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 65 LR.R.M. 1577
(June 30, 1967). In Schott's Bakery, the arbitrator had found that the employer acted dg-
criminatorily and out of anti-union animus in first transferring the union president to a
more onerous job, and then discharging him for his inability to perform the new work
satisfactorily. Under these circumstances, deference to the arbitrator's award could in no
way adversely affect the rights of the employee. In Howard Electric, the arbitrator also
found that the employee was not discharged for just cause, but rather for his union
activities. However, the arbitrator held that while the employee was entitled to back pay,
he was not entitled to reinstatement, because, under the collective agreement, the em-
ployer had an absolute right to refuse to reinstate any employee. Deference in this case
was highly improper. Allowing an employer who has admittedly discharged an employee
because of his union activities to refuse to reinstate the employee sanctions a direct
violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). See Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Mackay Radio 8: Tel. Co., 833 U.S.
307 (1938).
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for purposes of future contract negotiations, or as evidence in a griev-
ance proceeding; the employer will then refuse to supply the informa-
tion, claiming that the collective agreement gives the union no right
to demand it, or that it is irrelevant to any proper subject of collective
bargaining.84
The Board has not left the union's right to discovery a matter for
collective bargaining; it has rather read into Section 8(a)(5) a duty on
the part of the employer to supply all information relevant to the
union's task as bargaining agent "in negotiating a contract, or policing
or administering a contract, or adjusting a grievance."8 5 Given this
statutory duty, the Board will not defer to collective agreements which
purport to restrict more narrowly the union's right to discovery, nor to
arbitration awards based on such restrictive clauses.
80
The single case which departs from this statutory duty of broad
discovery has since been distinguished away. In Hercules Motor Corp.s l
the employer refused to allow the union to examine the employer's
data on wage rates. The union filed an 8(a)(5) charge; tie employer
defended on the ground that the data was irrelevant under a contract
which gave the union no right to question wage rates on grounds of
fairness or equity. The Board dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the union had claimed that the fairness of the wages during the
contract term was an arbitrable issue; whether this was so, held the
Board, was itself a matter of contract interpretation reserved for the
arbitrator.
The Board's later decision in Timken Roller Bearing Co.ss rendered
Hercules virtually meaningless. In Timken a union similarly requested
wage data as a prelude to filing a grievance. The union stated, however,
that it needed the information not only for the specific grievance
alleged, but also for general purposes of "policing or administering a
contract, or adjusting a grievance." Given this "general purpose," the
Board invoked its statutory rule and ordered the employer to disclose
the data. Though Timken did not expressly overrule Hercules, it left
it no more than a pleading obstacle easily circumvented; information
relevant to any issue governed by the contract can always be sought for
84. See, e.g., Acme Indus. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1965).
85. Hercules Motor Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 1648, 1652 (1962). The rule was explicitly
adopted in Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962).
86. See, e.g., Square D Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 15 (1962).
87. 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
88. 128 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962).
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"general" purposes of policing and administering a contract, as well as
for the purpose of pressing a single grievance.
The Supreme Court approved the Board's statutory rule of liberal
discovery in the recent case of NLRB v. Acme Industrial Corp.89 The
Court even argued that the rule supported the arbitral process, noting
that if unions can get whatever information seems relevant to ad-
ministration of the grievance machinery, they can more intelligently
decide which grievances to press to final arbitration. The Court's de-
cision thus finally removes discovery disputes from the ranks of those
in which the Board might defer to an arbitrator's decision. It confirms
that the statutory right to relevant information overrides any more
restrictive term in a collective agreement.
B. Unilateral Action
In one important class of unfair labor practice cases, a general rule
of deference to arbitration may be appropriate. Where the union
challenges the right of management to act unilaterally without con-
sulting the union, two questions are presented: (1) does the contract
authorize the employer to act without obtaining the agreement of the
union; and, if so, (2) does the contract allow the employer to take such
unilateral action without at least attempting to reach an agreement
with the union by good faith bargaining?
The Board can perhaps best leave both questions to the arbitrator.
Here Section 203(d) of the Act comes into play:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement.OQ
Arbitration is the remedy for which the parties have bargained. In
unilateral action cases, a persuasive argument can be made that no
federal policy extrinsic to the contract, no procedural bias, and no
inability to bind the essential parties disables the arbitrator. 01 If the
89. 385 US. 432 (1967).
90. Taft-Hartley Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
91. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) provides that the collective agree-
ment shall govern the terms and conditions of employment during the contract term.
Thus it may be argued that when a dispute arises during the contract term over what
the terms and conditions of employment are or should be, the only relevant question ts
what the contract provides. This, of course, is a question appropriate for arbitral deter-
mination. Taft-Hartley Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
Procedural bias is unlikely because the arbitrator is chosen by the parties to the dig.
pute, the union and the employer, and is equally responsible to both. The parties are
thus able to insure that the arbitrator adopts whatever degree of procedural fornality
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Board refuses to take such cases before the contractual issue is arbi-
trated, and then refuses to review the arbitrator's reading of the
contract, parties will be encouraged to settle cases of this sort through
arbitration alone.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that federal policy should
and does support a broad definition of the duty to bargain in cases
of unilateral action by the employer. Regardless of whether manage-
ment may act without reaching an agreement with the union, and if
so whether the union may strike in reprisal, 2 a policy of encouraging
the employer at least to discuss the proposed action with the union
in advance might promote industrial peace.1
The implications of this analysis are best shown by example. An
employer subcontracts out certain work without consulting the union.
The union protests that the action violates the collective agreement.
Management refuses to discuss the action, claiming that the manage-
ment prerogative clause in the contract allows it to subcontract out
work without bargaining with the union. The union demands ar-
they wish. See Wallen, Arbitrators and Judges-Dispelling the Hays' Haze, in Sout-
wEsTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEvELOP.MNrs 159 (1966).
Since charges of unilateral action during the contract term only arise where the dis-
putants have a collective agreement, assuming the contract provides for arbitration, the
promise to arbitrate is specifically enforceable, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), and the arbitrator's award is binding on the signatories of the agree-
ment. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel. & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
92. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) is concerned with the duty to
bargain, not the right to act. It leaves open the question whether, after good faith bar-
gaining, union and management may change the terms and conditions of emplo)nent
and use economic force to effectuate or frustrate the changes.
However, the implications of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 US. 560
(1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 US. 574 (1960), United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel 8: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), and Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) are that the collective agreement governs all conduct
by both employer and union during the contract term, and that all disagreements about
the scope of the contract must be resolved through arbitration, not by economic v.arfare,
when arbitration is available and the dispute in question has not been specifically with-
drawn from the arbitrator's jurisdiction. But see Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour,
369 U.S. at 105 n.14.
For a discussion of the extent to which the Supreme Court has curtailed the parties'
freedom to resort to forums other than arbitration to resolve disputes during the con-
tract term, see Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function,
34 Rav. Jom. U.P.R. 477 (1965); and Summers, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court:
1961 Term, in A.B.A. SECTION ON LABOR R-ELATIONS L-w, PRoCEms 51 (192).
93. Cf. FINAL REPORT OF TnE INDusTRIAL ComsxsisoN, H.R. Doc. No. 380, 57th Cong.,
1st Sess. 884 (1902):
The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodically determining the
conditions of labor by collective bargaining ... [i] that thereby each side obtains a
better understanding of the actual state of the industry, of the conditions which
confront the other side, and of the motives which influence it. Most strikes and
lockouts would not occur if each party understood exactly the position of the
other.. ..
But see Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 467 (19654).
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bitration on both issues: whether the employer may act unilaterally,
and, if so, whether it must first at least bargain in good faith with the
union. The arbitrator rules in favor of management on both issues.
The union then files a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the
employer has violated Section 8(a)(5) 94 by refusing to bargain.
The Board must decide what deference is due the arbitrator's de-
cision that the contract authorizes the employer to act without bar-
gaining. If it concludes that federal policy supports a broad duty to
bargain, one which the parties should not be allowed to overrule
lightly by their collective agreement, it should not defer to the arbitra-
tor's reading of the contract. Rather the Board should interpret the
agreement independently and refuse to find that the union has waived
its right to bargain with the employer unless the contract is explicit in
providing that management may take the specific action in question
without bargaining.
The limited sweep of this policy must be made clear. In deciding
the 8(a)(5) issue of the duty to bargain, the Board does not decide
whether the contract authorizes the employer ultimately to act uni-
laterally if he cannot reach agreement with the union. The policy
reflected in 8(a)(5), if any, relates only to the duty to bargain. Once
the parties have done that, the Board has no jurisdiction to decide
whether unilateral action is authorized by the contract. " Furthermore,
if the union then resubmits that issue to arbitration, arguing that the
Board's construction of the management prerogative clause bars uni-
lateral action, the arbitrator need not defer to the interpretation of
the contract by the Board. Even if the language of the agreement
regarding the duty to bargain is similar or identical to the language
defining management's authority to act unilaterally after bargaining
fails, the arbitrator should realize that the strict rules of interpreta-
tion applied by the Board stem from the federal policy to encourage
bargaining. His task, on the other hand, is to determine the intention
of the parties. Consequently, his rules of interpretation may differ from
94. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
95. Although the Taft-Hartley bill as originally introduced in the Senate made It
an unfair labor practice for either an employer or a union "to violate the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. . . " that provision was deleted from the final Act,
The intention was that "[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract the
enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to
the National Labor Relations Board." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1917),
quoted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957).
For an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the abortive provision making
it an unfair labor practice to violate a collective agreement, see Christensen, Arbitration,
Section 301, and the National Labor Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 411 (1962).
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the Board's, and he may arrive at a different construction of the same
or similar language.""
In fact, the Board has neither announced whether any policy favor-
ing a broad duty to bargain exists, nor attempted to justify any such
policy. Instead, it has simply undertaken the task of interpreting con-
tracts itself without advancing anything but ad hoc reasons for its
failure to defer to arbitration. Btween 1960 and 1967 the Board deided
on the merits 16 of 20 such unilateral cases involving the duty to bar-
gain despite the existence in each case of an arbitration dause covering
contract interpretation.97
The Board advanced one or more of five reasons for asserting juris-
diction in these sixteen cases: (1) neither party to the contract had
invoked the arbitration process; (2) the respondent had frustrated the
arbitration process by refusing to process the grievance; (3) the contract
was dear and unambiguous; (4) the charging party had not waived its
right to bargain about the change in the working conditions; and (5)
the arbitrator could not resolve the dispute.
The first reason, that neither party to the contract had invoked the
arbitration prQcess, is not wholly persuasive. While it is true that the
argument that the parties bargained for arbitration loses much of its
force when neither party wishes to avail itself of the bargained for
forum, arbitration remains the favored forum for disputes centering
around the meaning of the collective agreement. The average arbi-
96. Of course, if the union later brings a court action under § S01 of the Act, 29
US.C. § 185 (1964), charging that the employer has breached the contract by acting
unilaterally, the judge would need to determine whether federal policy requires a strict
construction of any clause allowing management to act unilaterally, or a broad con-
struction of any no-strike clause. The problem of judicial deference to arbitration deci-
sions is, however, beyond the scope of this Note. See generally P. HAys, Inon Arni-
RATION (1966); Christensen, Labor Arbitration and Judicial Oversight, 19 STN. L. R v.
671 (1967); Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. Cm.
L. RFv. 545 (1967); Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 471 (1962); Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards after the Trilogy,
53 CORNELL L. R v. 136 (1967).
97. The 16 cases the Board has decided on the merits are: Gravenslund Operating Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 66 L.R.R.M. 1323 (Nov. 27, 1967); W.P. Ihrie & Sons, 165 N.L.R.B.
No. 2, 65 L.R.LM. 1205 (fay 31, 1967); Adelson, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 64 L.R.M.
1346 (Afar. 13, 1967); Scam Instrument Corp., 163 N.LR.B. No. 39, 64 LR.R.M. 132.7 (Mar.
8, 1967); Central Rufina, 161 NLR.B. No. 59, 63 L.R.R.M. 1318 (Nov. 1, 1966); American
Fire Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 63 L.R.ILM. 1151 (Sept. 27, 1966); C & S
Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); Century
Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1965);
American Sign Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 537 (1965); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950
(1964); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964); Leroy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
1431 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); Square D Co.,
142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963).
The four cases in which the Board deferred are: Vickers, Inc., 15-3 N.L.R.B. 561 (1965);
Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.LR.B. 1311 (1963)
and Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418 (1962).
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trator may be more able than the Board to construe the unique mix-
ture of written contract and "common law of the shop" which makes
up a collective agreement.9 Moreover, arbitration minimizes public
intervention in collective bargaining, a goal of public policy quite
apart from the desires of the pardesY9
The second of the Board's reasons is more persuasive. If, aS in Leroy
Machine Co.,100 the respondent who asks the Board to require eX-
haustion of arbitral remedies has frustrated the arbitration process by
refusing to process grievances, the Board must either exercise jurisdic-
tion or require the charging party to bring a Section 301101 suit to
compel arbitration. The latter solution would allow a recalcitrant
employer to impose unwarranted delay and expense on the petitioner.
A remedy which would have the advantages of promoting private
resolution of grievances and securing construction of the contract by
the arbitrator, and yet not permit the respondent to delay adjudication
substantially, would be for the Board to withhold decision on the
merits for a specified period; perhaps 60 days, pending agreement of
both parties to arbitrate the dispute.
The third of the Board's reasons, that arbitration is unnecessary
because the terms of the contract are plain and unambiguous, smacks
of the now discredited Cutler-Hammer doctrine. In International
Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.102 the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that:
. .. If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be
arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate
and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration.10 6
The Supreme Court has explicitly disapproved of the Cutler-
Hammer doctrine. 0 4 Criticizing the New York decision as having had
"a crippling effect on grievance arbitration," and arguing that "arbl-
tration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle for
handling any and all disputes that arise under the agreement... j" the
Court has held that:
98. Cf. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 863 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers V. Warriok & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkets v. Enterpriso
Wheel & Car Corp.) 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
99. Samoff, Arbitration, Not NLRR Inteivention, 18 LAu. LJ. 602 (1967).
1190. 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
101. Section 801 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) authorizes t itd for
the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. Tektile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
102. 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aJJd, 997 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947),
103. 271 App. Div. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
104. United Steelworkers v. AmericAh Mfg. Co., 363 US. 564 (1960).
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Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of con-
tract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the
moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment,
when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bar-
gained for. 05
The Court's argument, which was directed towards the relations
between the arbitrator and the federal district courts, applies as well to
the Board. 06 Yet the Board has invoked the Cutler-Hammer doctrine
three times in the past two years as justification for deciding arbitrable
issues on the merits in unilateral action cases.'07 In Century Papers,0 s
the Board held, without benefit of the arbitration sought by the em-
ployer, that his action in unilaterally raising the wage rate was not
authorized by the contract:
But Respondent's assertion that a dispute over contract inter-
pretation exists does not make it so. Its contention requires, of
course, that we examine the contract. Having done so, we believe
that Respondent's efforts to invoke a question of contract inter-
pretation is wholly untenable and must fall in view of the plain
and unambiguous provisions of the contract.1
If in fact the Board is simply reacting to contract language which it
finds clear, it would do better to follow the Supreme Court and aban-
don Cutler-Hammer. Such abandonment has some costs, of course; a
few employers will attempt to delay rescission of unauthorized actions
by forcing arbitration on frivolous claims of contractual authoriza-
tion. But the delay such employers hope to gain will be more apparent
than real if the Board adopts a firm policy of accepting arbitrators' de-
cisions that unilateral actions without bargaining are unauthorized,
and grants prompt cease and desist orders on the basis of arbitration
awards. Alternatively, petitioners can gain enforcement of the awards
in the courts. Once employers learn that arbitration awards in this area
are accepted by Board and courts, they will stop incurring the expense
of futile review, and the statutory policy of private settlement of
purely contractual disputes will be achieved.
105. Id. at 567-68.
106. The Board is even less qualified than the courts to construe collective agreements;
moreover, the importance of permitting the parties to resolve contract disputes in the
bargained-for forum is no whit diminished when it is the Board and not the court that
is usurping the arbitrator's function.
107. C 9: S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.LU..
358 (1965); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1965).
108. 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965).
109. Id. at 361-62.
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Closely allied to the "plain and unambiguous" doctrine is the "no
waiver" doctrine which the Board has advanced in no less than seven
of the 16110 unilateral action cases it has decided on the merits. The
"no waiver" doctrine embodies two legal principles: that Section
8(d)"' confers on both the employer and the union the right to
bargain collectively during the contract term; and that this statutory
right can be lost only if it is voluntarily relinquished. 12 Waiver can
be inferred from the explicit terms of a contract, from the collective
bargaining history, from management prerogative clauses, and from
past practices of the parties." 3 Of course, the objective task of determin-
ing whether a union has waived its right to bargain is no different from
determining whether the employer is affirmatively authorized to take
the disputed action without first bargaining with the union. The
waiver question is thus identical with the question of contractual in-
terpretation, which, as argued above, should be decided by the ar-
bitrator.
The fifth and final Board argument, that the dispute cannot be
settled through arbitration because of the presence of a statutory issue,
has been advanced in nine of the 16 cases in which the NLRB has
decided unilateral action cases on the merits.114 Of course, if the con.
tractual and statutory questions do not overlap, there is no reason for
the Board to refrain from deciding the statutory question on the merits.
But at least two cases" 5 indicate that the determination that a dispute
is non-arbitrable may be no more than a restatement of the conclusion
that the contract does not authorize the disputed action. In Adams
Dairy"( the employer, during the contract term, took consumer mar-
110. Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 66 L.R.R.M. 1323 (Nov. 27,
1967); Adelson, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 64 L.R.R.M. 1346 (Mar. 13, 1967); American Fire
Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 63 L.R.R.M. 1151 (Sept. 27, 1966); Puerto Rico Tel.
Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964); Leroy
Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R..
1410 (1964); Square D Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963).
111. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
112. Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
113. Compare Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), with International Shoe Co.,
151 N.L.R.B. 693 (1965); Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965); Shell Chemical Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 298 (1964); and Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964).
114. Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 66 L.R.R.M. 1323 (Nov. 27,
1967); W.P. Ihrie 8: Sons, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 65 L.R.R.M. 1205 (May 31, 1967); Scant
Instrument Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 64 L.R.R.M. 1327 (Mar. 8, 1967); American Fire
Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1966), 63 L.R.R.M. 1151 (Sept. 27, 1966); C & S
Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966), Amerl.
can Sign Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 537 (1965); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964);
Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
115. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams
Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
116. 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
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keting accounts from his driver-salesmen and gave them to the inde-
pendent contractors. The employer argued that past practices and the
history of the collective-bargaining negotiations implicitly authorized
him to subcontract at will. The Board first applied the "no-waiver"
doctrine to conclude that the union did not waive its right to bargain
over subcontracting (i.e., the contract did not affirmatively authorize
subcontracting at will), and then held that the dispute was not arbi-
trable because the contract subjected to arbitration only disputes over
interpretation of the meaning of the contract's terms, and here there
was no dispute as to the meaning of any term in the contract. In short,
the Board interpreted the contract not to authorize the action, thus
supplanting the arbitrator's function, then concluded that the arbi-
trator was not needed.
Similarly, in Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co.11 7 an employer unilaterally
instituted a second shift with premium pay. The employer claimed that
the authorization for his action could be inferred from a combination
of contract provisions. The Board dismissed his argument as follows:
The law is well settled that, although a union may waive its
statutory right to be consulted about a bargainable subject, such
a waiver must be clear and unmistakable and will not be readily
implied.... Tested by the applicable criteria, it appears clear to us
that the foregoing contractural [sic] provisions, none of which ad-
verts as such to employment conditions applicable to a second-shift
operation, are insufficient by far, whether considered separately
or in juxtaposition, to support an inference of waiver.118
Having concluded that the contract did not authorize the action, the
Board could easily move to the further conclusion that the absence of
any contractual defense (i.e., "valid contractual defense") rendered
arbitration unnecessary.
There may, however, actually be some unilateral action cases where
the resolution of the contract dispute will not resolve the statutory
question. W. P. Ihrie & Sons"9 appears to be such a case. There the
question was whether the employer's cessation of checking off dues
following a vote by the bargaining unit members to withdraw their
checkoff authorization violated the Act regardless of whether his con-
duct was authorized by the contract. Here, as in the cases involving
discovery, a separate statutory policy promulgated by the Board was at
stake, and deference was not in order.
117. 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964).
118. Id. at 1508 n.2 (dtations deleted).
119. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 65 L.R.R.M. 1205 (fay 31, 1957).
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Thus, of the five reasoris put forward by the Board for not deferring
to arbitration in unilateral action cases, only two persuasively support
non-deference on their face: the frustration of arbitration by the
responding pa-tty, and the existence of a separate statutory policy which
renders interpretation of the collective agreement unnecessary. The
other reasons collapse into one another when examined; overtly they
all express a desire on the part of the Board to deal quickly with what
it regards as erroneous contractual justifications for unauthorized ac-
tions. If the Board is in fact simply essaying an objective reading of
the collective agreement in such cases, a greater willingness to defer to
arbitration is in order. Such a policy Would leave all such purely con-
tractual questions, even the putatively easy ones, in the forum which
can most expeditiously and least intrusively deal with them-the forum
of arbitration.
The possibility must also be congidered, however, that the Board is
not simply interpreting contract langtage which it finds dear, but
rather is subtly furthering a policy preference for an expanded duty
to bargain. By this analysis, the Board has at the very least attempted to
encourage employers to bargain before unilaterally implementing
management decisions by gently serving notice that it will not find
that management has reserved its right to act, or that the union has
waived its right to bargain over the issue, unless the contract is un-
equivocal in that regard. This policy may be sound. But if the Board
is attempting to advance such a policy by its willingness to decide
unilateral-action cases on their merits under Section 8(a) (5), its pur-
poses would be better served by a frank announcement of policy than
by disingenuous readings of collective agreements.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE I
REcoRD oF DEFERENCE By NLRB To THE ABnmAxoN PRocEss, 1960-19640
No. of Cases No. of Cases in Percentage of Cases
in which the which the NLRB in which the
Type of Dispute NLRB Deferred Did Not Defer NLRB Deferred
Bargaining Unit &
Representation Cases 31 32 50.07
Jurisdictional
Disputes 33 224 12.0
Employer Discriminatory
Practice Cases 45 140 22.2
Union Discriminatory
Practice Cases 27 68 25.0
Refusal to
Bargain Cases 59 1110 31.3
Total 17 56 23.3
Three factors have made difficult an accurate and complete classification of Board
cases involving the possibility of deference to arbitration. First, the issue of deference is
not always prominently discussed in NLRB opinions; frequently, the sole mention of
the existence of an arbitration provision is buried deep within a footnote to the trial
examiner's report. Consequently, it is possible that some cases have not turned up either
through a check of the Labor Relations Reference Manual indexes, citations in relevant
Board and court decisions, or discussion of these decisions in the secondary literature.
Since the LRRM indexes cite only those cases in which the Board discumd the possibility
of deferring to arbitration, it is likely that the statistics are weighted someuhat in favor
of the Board's deference to the arbitration process. Secondly, the Board has, all too often,
failed to state its reasoning with sufficient clarity to enable the commentator to determine
with confidence what, if any, weight is being given to the existence, or possibility, of
an arbitration award. Third, some cases involve multiple issues, raising problems as to
whether, for example, they should be classified as employer or union discriminatory
cases, or whether, if the Board deferred as to some points, but not as to others, they
should be considered examples of deference or non-deference. The number of marginal
cases, however, is sufficiently small that it is unlikely that these cases have significantly
distorted the results of the survey.
i. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1233 (1964); Insulation & Specialties,
Inc., 114 N.LR.B. 1540 (1963); Raley's Supermarkets, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963).
2. General Motors Corp., N.L.R.B. No. 7-RC-2793, 56 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1964); Savage
Arms Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1160
(1963).
3. McCloskey & Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1498 (1964); Matt J. Zaich Constr. Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
133 (1963). Armco Drainage & Metal Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962).
4. James H. Maloy, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 461 (1964); Belou & Co. Accoustics, 150 N.L.R.B.
21 (1964); Joseph B. Fay Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 759 (1964); Bellezza Co., 149 N.LR.B. 599
(1964); Cafasso Lathing & Plastering, Inc., 149 N.L.R. 156 (1964); E. P. Rihas, Inc., 147
N.L.R.B. 191 (1964); J. 0. Veteto & Son., 146 N.L.R.B. 1242 (196-); Stephen Gorman
Brickaying Co., 146 NL-R.B. 989 (1964); Service Elec. Co., 146 N.L.RB 483 (1964); Edgar
H. Hughes, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1903); George E. Miller Elec. Co.. 144 N.LYRB. 9
(1963); News Syndicate Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963); Schwerman Co., 139 N.LIB. 1426
(1962); 0. R. Karst, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962); Nichols Elec. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962;
Binswanger Glass C0., 137 N.L.R.B. 975 (1962); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
968 (1962); New York Times Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 665 (1962); Frank P. Badolato & Son, 135
N.L.R-B. 1392 (1962); Pulitzer Publishing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 958 (1960); Fluoro lcec.
Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 725 (1960); E. A. "Weinel, 127 N.L.R.B. 1377 (1960).
5. Modem Motor Express, Inc., 149 N.LR-B. 1507 (1964); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142
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TABLE II
RECORD OF DEFEILENCE BY THE NLRB To Tim ARBITRATION PRocEss, 1965-1967
No. of Cases No. of Cases in Percentage of Cases
in which the which the NLRB in which the
Type of Dispute NLR.B Deferred Did Not Defer NLRB Deferred
Bargaining Unit &-
Representation Cases 0 511 0.0%
Jurisdictional
Disputes 312 1213 20.0
Employer Discriminatory
Practice Cases 214 1415 12.5
Union Discriminatory
Practice Cases 0 210 0.0
Refusal to
Bargain Cases 11T 1218 7.7
Total 6 45 11.8
N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961); I. Oscher-
witz 8: Sons, 180 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961).
6. Aerodex, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964); Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149
N.L.R.B. 131 (1964); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964); Schreiber Trucking
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 697 (1964); National Screen Prods. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 746 (1964); Youngs-
town Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513
(1963); Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1963); Raytheon Co., 140 N.LR.B. 883
(1963); Greenwood Farms, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 649 (1963); Gateway Transp. Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962); Pontiac Motors Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413 (1961);
Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961); Monsonto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
7. Frazier-Davis Constr. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1964); International Harvester Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
8. Associated Plumbing, Heating & Piping Contractors, 149 N.L.R.B. 39 (1964); Allis.
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964); Lummus Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 517 (1963); Walsh
Constr. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 260 (1961); John I. Paulding, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1961);
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1960).
9. Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Sinclair Ref. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963):
Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963); Montgomery Ward 9- Co., 137 NLRB.
418 (1962); Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
10. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964); Employers' Ass'n of Bldg. Metal
Fabricators, 149 N.L.R.B. 382 (1964); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1961)"
Leroy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co,, 147
N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964); Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
145 N.L.R.B. 152 (1963); Square D Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963); Perkins Mach, Co., 141
N.L.R.B. 98 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co.,
132 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1961).
11. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 64 L.R.R.M. 1082 (Jan. 9, 1967);
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 159 N.L.R.B. 677 (1966); Pullman Indus. Inc., 159 N.L.R.B, 580
(1966); Hotel Employers Ass'n, 159 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966); Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 153
N.L.R.B. 1361 (1965).
12. Sundemeyer Painting Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 968 (1965); Don Cartage Co., 154 NLR.B.
513 (1965); Ebasco Servs., Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 873 (1965).
13. Southwestern Constr. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 66 L.R.R.M. 1012 (Aug. 22, 1967);
W. L. Richeson 8- Sons, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 65 L.R.R.M. 1722 (Aug. 1, 1967); Williams
Press, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 65 L.R.R.M. 1528 (June 30, 1967); Egan-McKay Elec.
Contractors, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 65 L.R.R.M. 1143 (May 16, 1967); Don Cartage
Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 63 L.R.R.M. 1085 (Sept. 13, 1966); Reynolds Elec. & Eng. Co,, 157
N.L.R.B. 1621 (1966); Layne-Western Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 695 (1965); D'Annunzio Bros., 152
N.L.R.B. 707 (1965); Decora, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 278 (1965); Prestress Erectors, Inc., 152
N.L.R.B. 269 (1965); Lusterlite Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 195 (1965); Bel-Toe Foundation Co.,
150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965).
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14. Howard Elec. Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 62 65 L.R.R.M. 1577 (June 30, 1967); Schott's
Bakery Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 65 L.R.R.M. 1180 (May 4, 1967).
15. Bird Trucking & Cartage Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 66 LR.R.M. 1179 (Sept. 28,
1967); Hribar Trucking, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 65 LR.R.M. 1155 (June 23, 1957);
Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp., 165 N.LR.B. No. 34, 65 L.R.R.M. 1296 (June 8, 1967); Star
Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 65 L.R.R.M. 1127 (May 12, 1957); Rotax
Metals, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 64 L.R.R.M. 1319 (Feb. 21, 1967); F. J. Buckner Corp..
163 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 64 L.R.R.M. 1273 (Feb. 23, 1967); D C Intl, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. No.
129, 64 L.R.R.M. 1177 (Feb. 1, 1967); Fiasco Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 64 L.R.R.M.
1077 (Jan. 5, 1967); Takin Bros. Freight Line, 160 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 62 L.R.R.M. 1613
(July 8, 1966); Tex-Tan Velhausen Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 1605 (1965); Auburn Rubber Co.,
156 N.L.R.B. 301 (1965); Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, 155 N.L.R.B. 447 (1965); Huttig
Sash & Door Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1965); Aetna Bearing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 845 (1955);
Mitchell Transp. Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 122 (1965).
16. Golden State Runway & Eng. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 92. 64 L.R.R.M. 1138 (Jan.
16, 1967); Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 63 L.R.R.I. 1495 (Dec. 13,
1966).
17. Vickers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 561 (1965).
18. Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.LR.B. No. 72, 66 LR.R.M. 1323 (May 31,
1967); W. P. Ihrie & Sons, 165 N.LR.B. No. 2, 65 L.R.R.M. 1205 (Nov. 27, 1957); Adelson,
Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 64 L.R.R.M. 1346 (Afar. 13, 1967); Scam Instrument Corp., 163
N.L.R.B. No. 39, 64 L.R.R.M 1327 (Mar. 8, 1967); Central Rufina, 161 N.LR.B. No. 59,
63 L.R.R.M. 1318 (Nov. 1, 1966); American Fire Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 104,
63 L.R.R.M. 1151 (Sept. 27, 1966); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454; Crescent Bed Co.,
157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965); Huttig Sash &
Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1965); American Sign Co., 153 N.LR.B. 537 (1955); Acme
Indus. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1965).
APPENDIX B
Record of Deference by the NLRB to the Joint Board
I. NLRB held that all parties were subject to the jurisdiction of the Joint Board and
must use its processes to settle their dispute: Sundermeyer Painting Co., 155 N.LR.B.
968 1965); fatt J. Zaich Cost. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 133 (1963); Armco Drainage & Metal
Prod. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962).
IL NLRB deferred to an award issued by the Joint Board: Ebasco Sers., Inc., 153
N.L.R.B. 873 (1965); McCloskey & Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1498 (1964).
III. NLRB held that although parties were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Joint Board it would nevertheless refrain from deciding the case until it could see whether
the parties would voluntarily submit to the Joint Board's jurisdiction: Don Cartage Co.,
154 N.L.R.B. 513 (1965).
IV. NLRB found that the Joint Board had jurisdiction over all the parties but never-
theless refused to defer to its decision because it determined that the Joint Board had failed
to decide the issue before the NLRB: Binswanger Glass Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 975 (1962);
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962).
V. NLRB refused to require the parties to invoke the Joint Board's processes, finding
that all parties had not agreed to submit to the Joint Board's jurisdiction: Layne-Western
Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 695 (1965); Prestress Erectors, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 269 (1965); Belou &
Co. Acoustics, Inc., 150 N.LR.B. 21 (1964); Frank P. Badolato & Son, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392
(1962).
VL NLRB refused to honor a Joint Board award because one or more of the disputants
had not agreed to be bound by its decisions: Southwestern Constr. Co., 167 N.LR.B.
No. 23, 66 L.R.R.M. 1012 (Aug. 22, 1967); Egan-McKay Elec. Contractors, Inc., 164 N.LR.B.
No. 94, 65 L.R.R.M. 1143 (May 16, 1967); D'Annunzio Bros., 152 N.LR.B. 707 (1955); Lus-
terlite Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 195 (1965); Bel-Toe Foundation Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965);
James H. Maloy, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 461 (1964); Joseph B. Fay, Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 759 (1964);
Bellezza Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 599 (1964); Cafasso Lathing & Plastering, Inc., 149 N.LR.B. 156
(1964); J. 0. Veteto & Son, 146 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1964); Stephen Gorman Brickla)ing Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 989 (1964); Service EIec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 483 (1964); Edgar H. Hughes Co., 144
N.L.R.B. 1358 (1963); George E. Miller Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 9 (1963); 0. R. Kant, 139
N.L.R.B. 591 (1962); Nichols Elec. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962); Fluoro Elec. Co.,
128 N.L.R.B. 725 (1960).
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VII. NLRB found that the Joint Board lacked jurisdiction over the rival unions:
Egan-McKay Elec. Contractors, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 65 L.R.R.M. 1143 (May 16, 1967);
Bel-Toe Foundation Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965); Service Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 483 (1964
George E. Miller Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 9 (1963); Nichols Elec. Co., 137 N.L,R.B. 1425
(1962).
VIII. NLRB, in cases where the employer refused to submit to the Joint Board's
jurisdiction, upheld the employer's decision as to which union should get the work:
Southwestern Constr. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 66 L.R.R.M. 1012 (Aug. 22, 1967); Layne-
Western Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 695 (1965); D'Annunzio Bros., 152 N.L.R.B. 707 (1965); Pre,.trcss
Erectors, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 269 (1965); Lusterlite Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 195 (1965); Bel.Toe
Foundation Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965); James H. Maloy, Inc., 150 N.LR.B. 461 (1964;
Belou & Co. Acoustics, 150 N.L.R.B. 21 (1964); Joseph B. Fay Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 759 (1964);
Bellezza Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 599 (1964); Cafasso Lathing & Plastering, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B.
156 (1964); J. 0. Veteto & Son, 146 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1964); Stephen Gorman Bricklaying Co.,
146 N.L.R.B. 989 (19q4); Service Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 483 (1964); Edgar H. Hughes Co.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1963); George E. Miller Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 9 (1963); 0. R. Karst, 189
N.L.R.B. 591 (1962); Nichols Elec. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962), Frank P. Badolato & Son,
135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962); Fluoro Elec. Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 725 (1960).
IX. NLRB in cases where the employer refused to submit to the Joint Board's jurisdlc-
tion, failed to uphold the employer's decision as to which union should get the work:
Egan-McKay Elec. Contractors, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 65 L.R.R.M. 1143 (May 16, 1967).
X. NLRB, in cases where the Joint Board rendered a decision despite the employer's
refusal to submit to its jurisdiction, found that the Joint Board had awarded the work to
thie right union: Egan-McKay Elec. Contractors, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No, 94, 65 L.R.R.M. 1143
(May 16, 1967); Lusterlite Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 195 (1965).
XI. NLRB, in cases where the Joint Board rendered a decision despite the employer's
refusal to submit to its jurisdiction, found that the Joint Board had awarded the work to
the wrong union (i.e., a union other than the one preferred by the employer): Southwestern
Constr. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 66 L.R.R.M. 1012 (Aug. 22, 1967); D'Annunzio Bros., 152
N.L.R.B. 707 (1965); Bel-Toe Foundation Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965); James I, Maloy,
Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 461 (1964); Joseph B. Fay Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 759 (1964); Bellezza Co,,
149 N.L.R.B. 599 (1964); Cafasso Lathing & Plastering, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 156 (1964);
J. 0. Veteto & Son, 146 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1964): Stephen Gorman Bricklaying Co., 146 N.L.R.B.
989 (1964); Service Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 483 (1964); Edgar H. Hughes Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
1358 (1963); George E. Miller Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 9 (1963); 0. R. Karst, 139 N.L.R.B.
591 (1962); Nichols Elec. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962); Fluoro Elec. Corp,, 128 N.L.R.B.
725 (1960).
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